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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH K. STUMPH, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CARLYLE F. GRONN lNG AND THE BOARD 
OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM· 




Case No. 15662 
--...._ Appeal from a decision of the Department of Employment Security, 
State of Utah, as upheld by the Appeals Referee 
and the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 
Joseph K. Stumph, Jr. 
3167 South 7945 West 
Magna, Utah 84044 
ProSe 
State of Utah 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
174 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
f~ r"' - ,...., 
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Joaeph K. Stumph, Jr. 
Attorney Pro se 
3167 South 7945 West 
~;,,'11a, Utah 84044 
Telerhone 250-5465 
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IN THE SUPRD:E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'-
Joseph K. Stumph, Jr. 
Plaint11'! 
ve. 
Carlyle F. Gronning and the 
Board of Review of The Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Department of 
&~ployment Security, 




Case No. 77-A-2626 
Decision, Case No. ??BR-212 
Joseph K. Stumph, Jr. ve. 
Department of Employment 
Security, No, 77-BR-212 
..............••....•..••......................• 
Plaintiff was denied unemployment compensation from June 20, 1977 
thru June 30, 1977 because the Department of Employment Security, State 
of Utah contends that plaintiff was entitled to, or could have taken hie 
allotted vacation time from Kennecott Copper Corporation during a scheduled 
v~cation shutdown June 13 thru July 3, 1977. Plaintiff originally scheduled 
his vacation during Karch and April (two weeks) for the purpose of trying 
to estJblish a business. Financing for the venture failed to materialize 
and defendant attempted to cancel the ~~rch and April vacation period and 
move it up to the company vacation shutdown in June-July. Kennecott refused to 
reschedule my vacation. My iomediate supervisor at the time, Mr. Joe Dalpaiz, 
communicated the company's decision of their refusal to r~schedule my vacation, 
to me sometim~ in ~arch, 1977. 
At my last hearing by the Department of Employment Security which was schedul 
January 17, 1978 I ~rote the Department saying I had to work that day and if I 
should lay off work to attend the hearing it would cost me perhaps half as much 
as I mi~ht expect to gain by a favorable decision by their department. 
[] tintiff ""~" f0r fl r"V"r-9£<1 Of the declo ion 
C0piPJ r,.:1ill'd to Rolwrt j\. i• tll'...,.,.~n, Atty. GPn. 
und F' 7("1 1 ..... (• t 1 r,, ri I '· /l.tt•:. ~(>))e 
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II II L 
n H f 
JIJSEPH K. Sll'l!c'rl, JP., 
Plaintiff, 
'iS. 
::APL Yl[ F. r.f<Oiillll.r, All[! TH[ BOARD 
OF PE'/I[\·1 OF THt IIIDL'STPIAL Cm~­
I.IISSIOII OF UTAH, DEPAPTI·IENT OF 
EIIPLOYI~EIIT SECL'R I TY, 
Defendants. 
S T A T E 
D E F E N D A N T S 1 
C 0 U R T 
0 F U T A H 
Case l~o. 15662 
8 R I E F 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
lhls is an action before the Supreme Court o• the State of Utah 
Pursuant to Section 35-4-10 ( i ) , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking 
judicial review of u decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mis~ion '·f L'tah, which cJenied unemrloyment compensation to the Plaintiff for 
c.; I SPOS IT I 011 BY LOWER AUTHOR I Tr 
f'IJintiff initially filed claims for unemployment compensation for 
tho'? period .'ur.c 19 throuyh July 2, 1977, A Department Representative denied 
~endirs ·"·,,J ,-l"irllitf .1ppealed. The Appeal Referee uffirmed the denial of 
tlenr:fit• .. ''r' -JIJ'•-cc:l, i>~<" 'loard of Peview affirmed the decision of the Appeal 
PefC'r,•c· l'v ,,, 'i-.ic:-n cJat.•J Januc1ry 74, 1Q78, in Case No. 77-A-2626, 77-BR-212. 
- I -
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decisions :>f the Board of Review anc 
the Appeal Referee, which denied benefits to Plaintiff on the grounds he had 
received or was entitled to receive remuneration in the form of vacation pay 
during the period of the plant shutdown by Kennecott Copper Corporation. 
Defendants seek affirmance of such decisions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, an employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation, was denied 
unemployment benefits during the period of a vacation shutdown In 1977. (R.OG: 
Upon appeal lng the denial of benefits, two separate hearings were scheduled k· 
Plaintiff. (R.0019, 0008) Plaintiff failed to appear at either hearing. 
(R.0017, 0007) The Board of Review affirmed the decision of the Appeal Refere' 
on the grounds that the evidence of record was Insufficient to show that Plair· 
tiff took his vacation prior to the vacation shutdown under compel I ing circum-




THAT THE APPEAL REFEREE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT 
ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF ON THE SOLE 
BASIS OF HIS UNSWORN LETTER OF APPEAL. 
This case Is a derivative of the circumstances which led to the 
issues decided by the Court In Mills, et al, v. Carlyle F. Gronning, 
Case No. 15622; and Brinkerhoff, et al, v. Carlyle F. Gronning, et al, 
pr :. 
et 
Case No. 15621; decided by the Court on June 26, 1978. The issues in those 
cases arose under circumstances surrounding a vacation shutdown by Kennecott 
Copper Corporation during the summer of 1977. It was he 1 d in the Mills anC: 
Brinkerhoff cases that individuals who elect to take vacation at a time other 
- 2 -
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than a vacation shutdown scheduled in accordance with the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement are not eligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to 
Section 35-4-S(hl U.C.A. 1953, unless the election was made under circumstances 
over which the individual had I ittle or no control and for which there was no 
reasonable alternative. 
In the Instant case Plaintiff scheduled his vacation for a period 
prior to the vacation shutdown. The only evidence as to the reason Plaintiff 
elected to take his vacation early is Plaintiff's unsworn letter of appeal, 
(R.0020) in which Plaintiff alleges that he did so in order to organize and 
start a business venture of his own. PI a inti ff further a I I eged in his I etter 
of apreal that when financing for his business venture failed to materialize, 
~e requested his vacation be rescheduled to the period of the vacation s~c·­
~own, but that corl'pany officials denied his request. When Plaintiff failed 
to appear for his scheduled appeal hearing, the Appeal Referee affirmed the 
ori~inal ~enial of benefits on the grounds that Plainti•f was entitled to 
~ceive vacation pay during the period of the vacation shutdown. (R.0017) 
This decision was based Jpon Section 35-4-5(h) of the Utah Employment Security 
'ct, as <~cS tr.e .jecision of the Department Representative. (R.0021l Plain-
tiff a~peal,cd t•j the Beard of Review, ·which body remanded the case for a new 
nearirq to ctt~in further evidence with respect to Plaintiff's contention that 
·e '·"S j.,r.i.cj t11e c.rrortunity to change his vacation to the period of the 
(f·'·'='~'iil Plaintiff again failed to appear at the scheduled 
near-inq .,111, ,,ln,ou·lll instructed that he could request the hearing be resched-
'"le-J if '• felt his f.'lilure to appear was with good cause, (R.0009l Plaintiff 
'•O>de nc, ~·J·r r· •;u·c .. t .. ·r•on Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing, the 
mattc•r ,,.'".' r•·h·rr•c·J tr, +f,p E'oard of Review for a decision. The Board's 
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decision was that the evidence was insufficient to show that the facts of the 
case come within the exception provision established by the Board, (R.0026l 
(and subsequently approved by the Court in the Mi~~s-Brinkerhoff matters 
referred to previously). 
The Issue thus presented Is twofold: (1) Is Plaintiff's unsworn 
letter of appeal admissible, credible evidence; and (2) Has Pia inti ff estab-
1 ished by reason of such evidence that the company's refusal to reschedule his 
vacation to the shutdown period constituted a compel I lng circumstance beyond 
his control, such as to qualify Plaintiff for the receipt of unemployment 
benefits? 
Section 35-4-lO(el, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part: 
The manner in which disputed matters shal I be presented, 
the reports thereon required from the claimant and employing 
units and the conduct of hearings and appeals shal I be in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the commission 
for determining the rights of the parties whether or not 
such regulations conform to common law or statutory rules 
of evidence and other technical rules of procedure .... 
Pursuant to the foregoing statutory authority, the Commission has 
promulgated the following regulation: 
4.b.(ll AI I hearings shal I, after due notice to the par-
ties, be conducted informally and In such manner as to 
ascertain and protect the rights of the parties. AI I issues 
relevant to the appeal shal I be considered and passed upon. 
Any party to an appeal shal I be given an adequate opportu-
nity to be heard and present any pertinent evidence of 
probative value and to know and rebut by cross-examination 
or otherwise any other evidence submitted. Oral or written 
evidence of any nature whether or not conforming to the 
legal rules of evidence may be accepted and given Its pro-
per weight. (Emphasis suppl led.) 
There is reason to conclude that the letter of appeal is hearsay 
evidence, from the fact that it contains a statement upon which Plaintiff 
rei ies, which Is unsworn and not subject to any type of examination by reason 
- 4 -
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of Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearings. (See 2 Jones, Evidence, 
6th Edition, Section 8:1, page 160. l Whether or not an unsworn statement is 
hearsay evidence or some other form of incompetent evidence would appear in 
the instant case to be immaterial. The only evidence available in the case 
at bar consists of two unsworn statements, the first from Kennecott Copper 
Corporation (R.0022) and the second being Plaintiff's letter of appeal. 
The implication of Regulation R4.b.(1) quoted above, is that all 
evidence which ma•; have a material bearing on the outcome of an adjudicative 
matter should be admitted in the administrative hearing, subject to being 
given appropriate weight by the Hearing Officer in reaching a decision. 
This interpretation is consistent with the position of some of the 
leading authorities on the subjects of evidence and administrative ~~~- rFor 
example, see 1 f-'igmore, Evidence, 3rd Edition, Section 40, pp. 42-43; 2 Davis, 
Adriinistratiue !.Arw Treatise, Section 14. 12, as supplemented; 36 A.L.R. 3d, 
Sections 5, 7, 22, and 27.) 
The board of Review did not err in determining that the unsworn let-
ter, standinq by itself, is insufficient to support a finding in favor of 
Plaintiff. L.:tah by precedent decision follows what is known in administrative 
law as the "residual rule." (See 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Supra, Section 4c, foot-
note 71, at f'· 90.) The "residual rule" basically provides that hearsay evidence 
is insufficient in and of itself as a basis tor a finding, unless supported by 
le~ally competent evidence. Although many authorities object to the use of the 
residual rule•, it rc>mains the law of this jurisdiction. (For detailed discus-
sions of II,,• nl·jections to the residual rule, see the authorities cited in the 
tor8 110i n.1 pJr,l•JI·aph.) The usc of hearsay evidence and the appl icabll ity of the 
residuul r·ule i,; r•resented in a very careful analysis of the issue by Larsen, J., 
- 5 -
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In the case of Ogden Iron Works, et al, v. Industrial Commission, 102 U. 492, 
132 P. 2d 376 {1942), a Workmen's Compensation case. in explaining the legis-
lative allowance of hearsay evidence in administrative hearings, Justice Lar~r 
stated: 
When the Legislature sanctioned the admission of this {hearsay) 
evidence, it follows by necessary Implication that it intended 
to authorize the commission to act upon it. But since the 
action of the commission results in a determination of the sub-
stantial rights of the parties, this court has long been com-
mitted to the position that there must be a residuum of evidence, 
legal and competent in a court of law, to support a claim before 
an award can be made, and a finding cannot be based only upon 
hearsay evidence. {Citations omitted.) To say the commission 
may receive and consider and act upon hearsay evidence, does 
not mean that the commission is obi iged to act upon alI hearsay 
evidence presented, but only that it may act upon it where the 
circumstances are such that the evidence offered is deemed by 
the commission to be trustworthy. {132 P. 2d, at p. 379.) 
In the instant matter Plaintiff has alleged that he was compelled to 
take his vacation early by reason of the company's refusal to allow him to 
reschedule his vacation to the shutdown period after having originally sched-
uled it early for business reasons. The Commission was not compel led to act 
upon that evidence alone in view of the many questions left unanswered by I 
Plaintiff's failure to appear at the hearing scheduled for him, and which mi~· 
have shed considerable I ight on the extent to which Plaintiff's circumstances 
were beyond his control. Those questions may reasonably have included: 
I. When did Plaintiff request that his vacation be rescheduled to 
the shutdown period and did his request a I I ow the emp 1 oyer sufficient time to ' 
make any necessary adjustments in the work schedule? 
2. Could the request have been made earlier, thus providing the 
employer more time to adjust to his work schedules? 
3. How definite were Plaintiff's plans to enter a business venture' 
Were such plans formalized and ready for implementation, or were thPy yet in 
- 6 -
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an infor~ .. 3l, "i J.ca" st3;ec of je·;elopment upon which the scheduling of vacation 
wou 1 d h ~ : '- -:, ~ ',: " " 'e r i a I e t f ec t 7 
ar ~orl 
eas i i . 
ser. r,...-
Gf 
.·::.:: :~ssi:le tusiness verture the sole reason for scheduling 
.ere r·~re also 1 r existence at the time other vacation-
.• -·er~ a,: :ar•icclar reason the business venture had tc have 
"c·:·-~:r I :eri~:, 0r cc•JIJ it "•ave been started as 
t'jC' -• t•e •ore~oing inquiries could have had a 
. :.~~- _, -• .•e-~er Plairtiff "a~ no reasonatle alTer-
~- on 
· ... ·,..-; i:.+s ~~""ese areas, th·.JS leaving the ·=-om-
-~~ scle ~asi~ c+ '''s unsworn and self-
--"--:: 
... -~· ..- .• ..- ~.~il~-~~ ~.~·~..--=~, 
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Therefore, the decisions of the Board of Review and the Commission 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Utah Attorney General 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mal led a copy of the foregoing Defendant's 
Brief to Joseph K. Stumph, Jr., ProSe, 3167 South 7945 West, Magna, Utah 84044, 
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